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Abstract
This analysis examines the opportunities and challenges facing the United Kingdom
(UK) government in building a closer economic partnership with China beyond Brexit.
While showing how the goals of each side overlap in key areas of mutual interest,
evidence is presented to explain how fundamental imbalances persist in trade and
investment relations due to China’s economic management system. The authors fur-
ther argue that political constraints imposed on the UK by the European Union (EU)
and the United States (US) as economic partners will constrain the British govern-
ment’s room for manoeuvre when negotiating with the Chinese. The analysis identifies
potential modalities for achieving some improvement in UK-China bilateral links by
drawing on the outcome of the Switzerland-China Free Trade Agreement but con-
cludes that political factors will continue to limit outcomes and that a major trans-
formation of UK-China economic relations is not a realistic prospect for the
foreseeable future.
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This analysis explores the opportunities and challenges facing the United Kingdom (UK)
government as it attempts to build a closer economic partnership with China outside the
European Union (EU) after Brexit (Department for International Trade, 2017).
Evidence will be presented to show that, while opportunities exist for the UK to
capitalise on important areas of mutual interest with China, political constraints persist
that will make it difficult to achieve positive outcomes. Britain will not be able to ignore
the concerns of its allies and trading partners in pursuing an independent agenda with
China (Baker McKenzie, 2018; Seaman et al., 2017). For China, the compatibility of
possible concessions to be made to the UK with the structure of China’s economic model
will be assessed (Asia Society Policy Institute, 2017). Current evidence from China
implies a consolidation of the China model and reluctance to make meaningful changes.
While the predominant focus of this analysis is the potential for enhanced economic
relations, there is a significant political dimension to all of this.
The analysis proceeds in three parts. The first section, “Economic Potential for
Agreement,” evaluates what each side is looking for in a closer partnership. A second
section, “Political Constraints,” describes the domestic and international constraints that
will limit the scope for significant concessions. The final section, “A Potential Nego-
tiating Approach,” identifies possible modalities for negotiations by drawing on the Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) between China and Switzerland.
This examination concludes that UK will not secure its economic interests with China
to an extent that justifies the rhetoric of the golden era discourse (Taylor, 2017). It may
obtain modest concessions from the Chinese in narrow areas of the economy but on
current evidence it is unlikely to build “a global comprehensive strategic partnership for
the 21st Century” with China anytime soon (HM Treasury, 2016: 1).
Economic Potential for Agreement
(i) What does the UK want from China?
Current evidence suggests that Britain has three broad objectives: to reconfigure its trade
relations with China in order to reflect UK capabilities in the services sector, to create an
improved climate for two-way direct investment, and to pursue the objective of eco-
nomic reform in China so far addressed in EU-China negotiations (Liu and Li, 2016; UK
Trade & Investment, 2015).
Rebalancing Bilateral Trade
UK-China trade has grown quickly over the past two decades, with an eight-fold
increase of UK exports to China over the period 1999–2015 and a ten-fold increase in
UK imports from China over the same period (ONS, 2018). Nevertheless, China’s share
of total UK exports was only 4 per cent in 2016 – modest for the world’s second largest
economy (WTO Statistical Review, 2016).
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UK trade with China is not only relatively small but also imbalanced. China exported
twice as much to the UK in 2017 as the UK did to China, despite the rapid growth of UK
exports in recent years, with the Chinese economy being the UK’s fourth largest source
of imported goods, generating a significant trade surplus in China’s favour (ONS, 2018).
This imbalance is exacerbated by the fact that trade in services with China, a major
strength of the UK, is underdeveloped. While UK exports of goods to China accounted
for 10 per cent of UK global goods exports in 2015, the comparable figure for services
was 1 per cent (OECD, 2016a, 2016b).
While specific UK priorities for trade policy with China remain undefined, there are
enthusiastic endorsements from official, semi-official, and media sources that highlight
potential for future mutually advantageous opportunities. The UK’s 2015 Joint Statement
on building a strategic partnership with China focused on boosting bilateral investment
and promoting other forms of cooperation through continuing to expand two-way trade
in goods and services and addressing business concerns regarding market access and
regulations (Cooper, 2017; FCO, 2015).
Promoting Two-Way Investment
Conditions for international foreign direct investment (FDI), including legal protection
and market access, are set by bilateral agreements since there is no international reg-
ulatory framework for FDI comparable with the role of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) for trade. Negotiations between the EU and China for a bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) have been going on for years (European Commission, 2018). Current rules
favour Chinese FDI into European economies rather than the reverse, because of China’s
exclusion of inward FDI in many sectors, especially services, and restrictive conditions for
FDI in others. In the first decade of this century, EU FDI flows to China grew rapidly but
they stagnated after the economic crisis and have failed to recover, declining 23 per cent
during 2016. Meanwhile, Chinese FDI into the EU accelerated sharply to reach EUR 35
billion in 2016, an increase of 77 per cent over the previous year. While totals have since
declined from this peak they remain significant. The reduction is due to China’s foreign
exchange controls to restrict purchases in overseas sectors such as real estate than to a
reduced Chinese interest in European knowledge sectors, with nearly half of all such
investments going into the UK, Germany, and France (Hanemann et al., 2019).
Britain and China have strikingly different investment policies and the opportunities
for FDI in each economy are imbalanced in China’s favour. In the 2017 FDI Regulatory
Restrictiveness Index, the UK was judged to have among the most liberal rules in respect
of inward FDI (ranked eleventh most liberal of sixty-three states considered) in stark
contrast to China, which ranked fifty-ninth (OECD, 2017). The UK wants to improve its
investment access to the Chinese market in areas where it is most competitive, especially
financial services. A key objective of Brexit is to directly manage bilateral investment
relationships and repatriate powers to handle economic disputes, a pledge affirmed by
Britain’s Trade Secretary at the end of 2017 (Parker, 2017).
There is currently no evidence to suggest that the British government will seek to
renegotiate its 1986 BIT with China as a separate legal undertaking. Instead, one
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possible approach would be for both sides to agree that an investment chapter become
part of the negotiations for a UK-China comprehensive FTA. This would seem sensible,
since the 1986 treaty is mainly concerned with investor protection and makes no
mention of market regulation or sector access and ownership issues, in keeping with
most BITs signed by China from that era (Shen, 2018). Creating an investment chapter
has been the preferred approach for FTAs that China has concluded with industrialised
economies such as Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia, while Switzerland’s FTA
had an investment promotion chapter linked to a BIT signed with China in 2010
(Wenfei Law, 2013).
Pursuing Economic Reform in China
Britain will also have to take over from the EU in addressing other problems in its
economic relations with China, such as technical barriers to trade, regulatory obstacles
hindering commercial activity by foreign firms, unfair treatment compared to Chinese
enterprises, and national security legislation that discriminates against foreign enterprises
(European Chamber, 2017).
(ii) What does China want from the UK?
The leverage that the UK may possess to shift China’s position in future negotiations
will in part depend on the extent to which the UK is able to meet China’s objectives for
closer bilateral ties with Britain. These reflect the same priorities as China’s relations
with other major economic partners: to build bilateral structures within an FTA that help
to promote stable and sustainable economic growth to reinforce Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) legitimacy (Naughton, 2016). But this broad objective can be broken down
into a number of specific components.
Achieving Market Economy Status
The scope of China’s bilateral economic agreements has shifted over time, moving
beyond a narrow focus on tariff reductions to encompass more wide-ranging issues such
as trade in services and investment (Pan, 2014). This suggests that China is prepared to
include sectors that match UK priorities within a future agreement. But it will impose
one overriding condition: recognition of China as a market economy.
Under WTO trade defence rules specific treatment is accorded to exporters based in
WTO member countries that are not recognised as market economies. In particular, the
importing country may disregard their production price data and replace it with data
from comparable producers in market economies, which usually results in a higher
production price and a higher anti-dumping duty. But the importance of market
economy status (MES) for China goes well beyond this technical issue. China con-
siders that its WTO accession agreement of 2001 provided for automatic recognition of
MES for China in 2016, whereas major developed economy members of WTO
(notably, the United States (US), the EU, and Japan) regard MES for China as
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conditional on the Chinese economy meeting specific conditions laid down in the
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Achieving MES recognition is a critical part of the FTA negotiating process for China.
Australia, NewZealand, and Switzerland have all negotiated FTAswith China that recognise
it as a market economy. Conversely, the EU-China Summit meeting of June 2017 failed to
issue a final communiqué because of disagreement over the inclusion of EU commitments
to address MES, despite collaboration on climate change policy (Deutsche Welle, 2017).
Any UK-China agreement is likely to be dependent on the UK recognising China as a
market economy, which the UK’s other major partners would not welcome.
Access to British Technology
The Chinese maintain that trade and investment cooperation in high value, knowledge-
rich sectors such as services and advanced technology holds the key to China’s future
success. Analysis by the Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG) argues that China’s
international engagement strategy prioritises the need to increase competitiveness
through the acquisition of international management skills and high-technology assets
(CCG, 2017). The Global Competitiveness Index confirms that the UK is a technology
leader in areas of Chinese interest, such as capacity for innovation and the quality of
domestic research institutions (World Economic Forum, 2016).
The Made in China 2025 initiative supports upgrading across numerous Chinese
industrial sectors through a build or buy approach and helps to explain why inward
technology-seeking FDI from China into advanced economies like the UK and Germany
has surged since 2015 (Hanemann and Huotari, 2017; Kennedy, 2015). The UK’s
knowledge base in advanced manufacturing and information and communications
technology overlaps with China’s priorities in areas of weakness such as robotics,
sensors, and radio frequency chips that could enable Chinese enterprises to compete at
the highest level internationally (Wübbeke et al., 2016).
Commercially, mergers and acquisitions activity by Chinese companies has reflected
UK expertise (China-Britain Business Council, 2016). In June 2017, China’s Shaanxi
Ligeance Mineral Resources acquired Derby-based Gardner Aerospace for GBP 326
million, as China seeks to develop capabilities in advanced aero-engine manufacturing to
match those of Airbus and Boeing (Aviation Week Network, 2017). Institutionally, the
UK-China Research and Innovation Partnership fund helps to facilitate over GBP 200
million worth of project spending in 37 joint programmes and over 220 partnerships in
fields such as biotechnology, healthcare, urbanisation, and agri-foods (Research Coun-
cils UK, 2017).
This evidence suggests that Britain is seen by China as a potential source of tech-
nology in priority areas for the Chinese economy.
Showcasing Chinese Infrastructure
The UK’s open attitude to inward FDI, even in politically sensitive infrastructure
sectors such as nuclear energy, allows China’s energy majors to show what they can do
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in a leading developed economy. It offers the Chinese not only stable long-term
investment returns from funding projects but also a means of publicising China’s
capabilities as an infrastructure leader. This is a key element in supporting China’s
strategic push into developing countries. This underlines the importance of using
China’s Hualong One reactor technology in the upgrade of energy facilities at Bradwell
(World Nuclear News, 2017). The significance of this opportunity for China helps to
explain the warnings from Chinese commentators during 2016 of the consequences for
future UK-China cooperation if UK government approval for the project were to be
withdrawn (Yuan, 2016).
China has an infrastructure footprint in Britain in other sectors, too. Major railway
building projects such as HS2 include Chinese enterprises among the project’s train
operation and fulfilment partners, while London’s current upgrade of its drinking water
supply and sewerage system also has Chinese investment through a shareholding by
China’s sovereign wealth fund in the UK utilities firm Thames Water (Peterson, 2017;
Sakoui, 2012). In high-technology sectors, China is also visible. Huawei has held a key
role in supplying network switching equipment for the UK’s telecommunications
infrastructure in partnership with British Telecom that long predates current security
controversies over Fifth Generation (5G) procurement (Mehta, 2013).
RMB Internationalisation
China is promoting its currency, the renminbi (RMB), as an alternative store of inter-
national monetary value to the US dollar and Euro. London remains a key part of this
internationalisation strategy, despite question marks over whether the City can retain its
leadership after Brexit (Leung, 2016; Liu and Li, 2016). Swift’s RMB Tracker series,
that monitors the Chinese currency’s usage outside mainland China, has consistently
shown London to be second only to Hong Kong as an international hub for the Chinese
currency, and by far the most important European centre (Swift, 2019).
The gap between the UK and the next two most important European hubs, France and
Germany, remains significant in terms of both customer-initiated and institutional pay-
ments traffic by value, although both continental rivals have seen growth in RMB
activity since the UK’s Brexit Referendum. While a number of UK-based financial firms
have moved personnel into Dublin, Paris, and Frankfurt, attempts by these other
financial centres to replicate London’s depth of expertise and interconnections with
American financial markets, especially in foreign exchange, are unlikely to be
straightforward or rapid (Subacchi and Oxenford, 2017: 7).
Political Constraints
Despite these opportunities, significant political constraints will operate on both China
and the UK to limit future growth in the scope and depth of UK-China economic
relations.
Irwin Crookes and Farnell 111
(i) External constraints on the UK
From the EU
The EU will constitute a major constraint on British policy towards China after Brexit. It
will influence the UK economy and limit options for international negotiations, partic-
ularly if the UK remains in a customs union with the EU. Studies show the dominant
influence of EU demand and market size on the UK economy compared to that of third
countries with which the UK may negotiate trade deals (Dhingra et al., 2017). In 2018,
the EU accounted for 49.3 per cent of UK two-way trade, compared to 14.6 per cent for
the US and 5.3 per cent for China (Department for International Trade, 2019).
Some EU-based constraints may be accepted voluntarily. The UK may choose to align
its standards and technical regulations with the EU in sectors where the EU is a major or
dominant market for UK exports (motor vehicles, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals) or where
EU regulation has replaced US regulation as the de facto world standard (chemicals). In
emerging technologies, the UK may choose to follow European standards to assure its
competitiveness in a large adjacent market. Wherever it aligns with EU rules, it may be
reluctant to recognise different standards in agreements with countries like China.
EU pressure on the UK regarding its external economic relations after Brexit will be
political as well as technical. Any advantages that the EU might be prepared to grant the
UK under a long-term partnership agreement are likely to be made conditional on
Britain’s compliance with broader principles of economic management. The EU sees
risks in future UK divergence from EU competition rules, including those that affect
international trade and investment. Recent internal EU discussions suggest a future
strategy involving sector-specific conditionality backed up by retaliatory measures
should the UK not comply (Barker and Brunsden, 2018; European Commission, 2018).
Such conditionality could, for example, apply to the question of UK treatment of state
aid in China. The EU has pointed to the use of state subsidies used by China to promote
the international success of its firms as an example of distortions that negatively affect
EU-China economic relations (European Commission and EU High Representative,
2019; Vincenti, 2017). In March 2019, it adopted a regulation establishing a framework
for screening FDI into the EU, as a response to the allegedly predatory nature of
technology-seeking FDI from China in sectors such as robotics, chip design, and engine
technology (Official Journal of the European Union, 2019). British attitudes, however,
occasionally diverge from European regulatory norms (Potter, 2017). The UK govern-
ment issued a White Paper in July 2018 that outlined scenarios for revised screening
procedures for foreign investment in sensitive sectors; despite outlining tighter owner-
ship rules on grounds of national security, the proposals do not appear to be as com-
prehensive as the EU’s approach (Glover and Pickford, 2017).
From the US
The US, too, can be expected to exert influence on the UK’s approach to post-Brexit
trade and investment negotiations with China. Recent decisions by the Trump
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administration to characterise China as a strategic competitor, to raise tariffs on Chinese
imports, and to strengthen the remit of the regulatory Committee on Foreign Investment
into the United States (CFIUS) are weaponising economics against Chinese policies
(The White House, 2017).
Evidence already suggests that the US is ready to respond robustly to any foreign
government, ally or not, that takes measures in respect of China that undermine US
interests, such as by granting China MES, offering concessions that might reduce
international pressure on China to abide by international rules, or permitting acquisitions
of technology assets by Chinese state-backed firms.
The Trump administration has introduced new rules under Article 32 of the US-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) signed in November 2018 that empower the
US to terminate the USMCA if the other parties choose to sign an FTAwith what the US
defines as a non-market economy, such as China. The document that outlines American
objectives in negotiations to secure a US-Japan FTA contains similar restrictions (USTR,
2018a: para 32; 2018b: 17). It is reasonable to assume that Britain would face similar
negotiating conditions and would then have to choose between closer cooperation with
the US, a long-standing economic and security ally, and developing a new relationship
with China (Plouffe, 2019).
(ii) Domestic constraints
Domestic Constraints for the UK
Internal political constraints on the UK’s policy towards China will emerge after Brexit.
Inside the EU, the UK has promoted a liberal economic approach, with an emphasis
on openness that has broadly favoured Chinese interests in EU decision-making
(Summers, 2017). The UK-led opposition in 2016 to harsher trade defence measures
against China and British objections to the removal of the lesser duty rule are examples
(Oliver et al., 2017).
The repatriation of responsibilities after Brexit, however, will make the UK’s eco-
nomic policy towards China more visible to a domestic audience and more controversial.
For example, designing a closer economic partnership with China will involve simul-
taneously crafting trade defence instruments to deal with economic threats, determining
whether (and when) to recognise China as a market economy, and balancing the needs of
producers versus consumers in trade policy under the intense spotlight of public opinion
(Owen and Walter, 2017).
Political issues such as national security and human rights considerations will also come
to the fore, as the UK tries to find a middle way between achieving closer economic coop-
eration with China andmaintaining a high profile as defender of the international legal order.
The protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI) is an essential part of creating
robust defence capabilities that overlaps with what security specialists refer to as a “total
warfare” discourse (CPNI, 2019; Mumford, 2013:41). CNI covers the financial system,
telecommunications, and energy subsystems and China’s evolving relationship with the
UK concerns each of these areas in ways that will pose dilemmas for the UK govern-
ment. A nuanced evaluation will be required to balance the economic opportunities of
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closer relations with China against the need to protect the UK against perceived vul-
nerabilities from the possibility of illicit interference by China’s party-state apparatus
(Parton, 2019).
Striking the right balance for an effective and proportionate security response to China
will not be easy, as the controversy over whether to use Huawei-designed equipment and
software in the UK’s 5G wireless infrastructure has shown. The British government has
sought a proportionate response, by creating a Single National Technical Authority to
conduct apolitical assessments driven by technical analysis (CESG, 2019). The most
recent review of Huawei products has revealed concerns about the resilience of software
design but no evidence of overt interference. Nevertheless, the potential extraterritorial
reach of China’s national security law, that obliges domestic firms to cooperate with
Chinese security agencies if and when required, inhibits international trust and places
technical assessments firmly in the political domain (Levy, 2019). At the time of writing,
the UK government has not taken a definitive decision over Huawei’s participation in the
domestic 5G network but unprecedented leaks of the discussions in the National Security
Council in April 2019 suggest that opinions are divided at the highest level of government.
Discussions with China over human rights concerns at the EU and Member State
level have long been contentious and have centred on the divergence between European
prioritisation of political rights for individuals and Chinese emphasis on societal eco-
nomic rights. The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue has been criticised as an exercise
of questionable credibility “whose purpose is largely to secure another round of the
dialogue, not to make meaningful change in China” (Human Rights Watch, 2017: para
5). The UK holds its own dialogue on human rights with China, welcomed by British
politicians but a target for criticism in the UK media, which have questioned its effec-
tiveness in delivering change (Phillips, 2017).
Once the UK has left the EU, London’s articulation of its normative principles and
political interests will come under closer scrutiny. Ministers will need to find a
balance between demands at home for stronger engagement with China and highly
controversial issues such as democracy in Hong Kong, mass detentions in Xinjiang,
and China’s role in the future of the international system, while taking account of the
sensitivities of Chinese politicians over foreign criticism of China’s internal political
system and the direction of Chinese policy (Blanchard, 2012; Tugendhat, 2019;
Walker et al., 2019).
Senior officials in Whitehall remember the consequences of David Cameron’s deci-
sion to meet the Dalai Lama in 2012 and will have noted China’s sharp reaction to the
possibility of the UK deploying a Royal Navy aircraft carrier to the South China Sea
(BBC, 2012; Holmes, 2019). Difficult choices will have to be made in building a closer
relationship with China after Brexit and British politicians will take full responsibility for
the political and economic ramifications of their decisions.
Domestic Constraints for China
China also has domestic political constraints that limit what is possible as it maintains
distinctive preferences for the further opening of its economy.
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The political objectives of the CCP are to maintain the party’s leadership in power,
reinforce social stability, and promote domestic economic development. These aims are
interdependent and justify the primacy of state actors in the economy. Current evidence
suggests that the party-state, far from being ready to release market forces under a neo-
liberal model, is strengthening its own role (Eaton, 2016). In President Xi’s statement to
the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the role of state activism
in China’s economy received strong support (Dollar, 2017). China’s economic priorities
lie with promoting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as national champions that dom-
inate key industrial sectors along with some favoured private firms. SOEs connect the
CCP to the economic performance on which the legitimacy of the regime depends.
Current analysis suggests that China’s reform preferences are to reinforce political
levers and administrative tools that centralise economic control rather than to imple-
ment a legally transparent regulatory system (Grieger, 2016; Naughton, 2018). This
trend only reinforces the reluctance of major Western economies to recognise China as
a market economy.
Notwithstanding the steps towards further liberalisation offered by China in 2018 in
response to US pressure, the breakdown of US-China negotiations for a resolution of
their worsening trade dispute in May 2019 provides little evidence to suggest that
Chinese policy will change markedly from the statist approach followed since 2012 by
Xi Jinping. There is certainly no compelling rationale for China to make policy
adjustments for the UK alone.
A Potential Negotiating Approach
Despite these political constraints, there are possibilities for limited two-way concessions
that could improve current UK-China economic relations and take into account the
importance for the UK of promoting services in an economic agreement with China.
The Swiss-China FTA
The Swiss FTA with China of 2014 offers a possible template for the UK. While
Switzerland is a considerably smaller economy, its focus on high-end manufacturing,
advanced services, and technological innovation means that the underlying structure of
its competitive advantage is similar to that of the UK.
In terms of reciprocal tariff reductions on goods, the Switzerland-China FTAwill lead
to the abolition or substantial reduction of import customs duties on both sides, but its
implementation is asymmetrical. For Swiss duties on goods from China, the majority of
product lines in the FTA were rated at zero as soon as the FTA entered into force. By
contrast, most tariffs on Swiss products exported to China will be eliminated over five to
twelve years (Brunschweiler and Troller, 2014: 5–6).
The services chapters of the Swiss FTA with China show promising possibilities.
While most of them offered little more than WTO norms, two concessions stood out.
The first was in financial services, in respect of ownership of joint venture securities
firms, where special terms were accorded to the Swiss which matched the conditions
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available to companies based within the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone (FTZ) but
which were applied nationally (Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone, 2013: 20). The second
concession secured by Switzerland was protection for Swiss acoustic trademarks that
went beyond trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS) standards, together
with stronger enforcement of intellectual property violations of Swiss geographical
indicators (Wenfei Law, 2013).
The UK should note that these negotiations were neither swift nor straightforward.
Switzerland granted MES to China in 2007, opened FTA negotiations in 2011, and only
secured final agreement after nine rounds of talks in 2013, with the FTA coming into
force in July 2014.
A Possible UK Strategy
The UK could emulate the Swiss tactics, focusing on specific sectorial concessions in
an FTA but covering a greater number of service sectors. Such an approach could seek
to build on conditions already available in Chinese FTZs to a narrow number of
industrial and technological business areas but have them apply to UK wholly-owned
companies and joint ventures across China. The possibilities for the UK to exercise
leverage on China are likely to remain limited, confined to a few specialist sectors in
which Britain remains a globally competitive leader, such as scientific research,
securities trading, and biotechnology product development. The UK would also need
to make clear to China from the start that these are its key priorities and to stick to
them – an important lesson learnt by the Swiss. Such a framework could form a
starting point for a focused engagement with China.
Yet achieving even this modest outcome would remain politically difficult, for three
reasons.
First, it is hard to see what additional market access the UK could offer to China in
order to leverage significant advantages in return. It is already one of the most open
economies and the domestic and international pressures referred to earlier will tend to
inhibit further negotiating leverage with China.
Seen from the Chinese standpoint, it is also unrealistic to suppose that China would
be ready to offer the UK, a relatively small economy compared with China’s principal
trade and investment partners such as the US and EU, privileged access to its market.
In 2018, UK GDP was just over GBP 2 trillion compared with a combined EU-27 GDP
of EUR 13.5 trillion, implying a natural gravitational pull on China to prioritise a deal
with the much larger continental market (Eurostat, 2019; ONS, 2019). The Chinese are
renowned for their transactional approach towards international negotiations and it
may therefore be “fanciful to imagine that Britain on its own could succeed in dis-
mantling anti-competitive practices and barriers to entry when intense pressure from
the US and the EU has failed” (Richards, 2017: para 8).
Finally, the UK also comes to the negotiating table with specific political baggage that
may undermine its case for special treatment from China. It is a close ally of the US,
whose current administration has characterised China as a strategic competitor. It has been
a critic of China’s human rights record, a protagonist implicated in humiliating China for
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more than a century, and a nation that occupied part of China until 1997 and continues to
have treaty commitments to that territory under international law. Last but not least, the
UK has recently chosen to leave a 46-year-old economic partnership with a neighbouring
market of over 400 million continental consumers and is now looking for new friends.
This is a difficult starting point for talks about a future of closer collaboration.
Conclusions
This analysis has shown that the challenges facing the UK in forging a closer economic
relationship with China after leaving the EU are considerable. Unlocking the door to a
mutually beneficial partnership will be a formidable task. The UK will have to come to
terms with the constraints placed upon its own room for manoeuvre as well as the
political obstacles within China to further economic reform.
Other European economies have shown that incremental and partial progress towards
better economic relations with China is possible. The UK has technological know-how
and assets that China needs, together with a broadly open attitude towards foreign
acquisitions. Drawing on the experience of the Swiss, this analysis has identified a
potential strategy for the UK that could yield a concrete, if modest, dividend. A major
transformation of UK-China economic relations is not, however, a realistic prospect for
the foreseeable future.
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